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Becker v. IRM Corporation: The Final
Chapter in the Destruction of
Landlord Tort Immunity
In Becker v. IRM Corporation,I the California Supreme Court held
that a landlord in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in
tort when a defect in the premises, present at the inception of the lease,
injures the tenant. Part I of this note will set forth the facts and deci-
sion of the case. Part II will discuss the legal background of Becker and
Part III will examine the likely ramifications of the opinion, both in
California and in other jurisdictions.
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
George Becker, a tenant in a 36-unit apartment complex owned by
the IRM Corporation, broke and severely lacerated his arm when he
slipped and fell against a frosted glass shower door in his apartment.
The door, made of untempered glass, broke upon impact. Becker filed
claims for negligence and strict liability against the corporate landlord.'
Officers of IRM Corporation did not dispute that the risk of serious
injury to Becker would have been substantially reduced if the shower
door had been built with tempered rather than untempered glass. In-
stead, IRM Corporation contended that the traditional common law tort
immunity of landlords3 precluded recovery. The corporation contended
that there had been neither a concealment of a known danger nor an
express contractual or statutory duty to repair. Absent the application
of these or other exceptions to immunity," a landowner at common law
1. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
2. While the case was pending before the California Supreme Court, the plaintiff settled
with the builder and a door assembler-installer for $150,000, with a contingent settlement of
an additional $50,000 if plaintiff did not succeed against the remaining defendants. Id. at 457
n.1, 698 P.2d at 117 n.1, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214 n.1.
3. The common law rules governing the relation of landlord and tenant substantially ab-
solved the landlord of responsibility in tort for injury caused by the condition of the premises.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §356 (1965).
4. THE REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) lists six exceptions to the general rule
that a lessor of land is not liable to the lessee. The lessor generally has no immunity when
the lessor contracts to repair, REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §357 (1965); when there are
undisclosed dangerous conditions known to the lessor, RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §358
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could not be held liable in tort for injuries to land occupiers. IRM
Corporation moved for summary judgment.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the defendant cor-
poration filed affidavits explaining that the apartment complex had been
built in 1962 and 1963 and that the defendant acquired the building in
1974. Before purchasing the complex, two officers of the corporation
inspected each apartment and observed that all the shower doors appeared
similar. No accidents involving any shower door had occurred prior to
Becker's accident in 1978 and the corporate officers were unaware until
after Becker's injury that some of the shower doors were constructed
of untempered glass. After the plaintiff's accident, the maintenance per-
sonnel of IRM Corporation inspected the shower door in each apart-
ment. A close inspection revealed a small mark, indicating untempered
glass, in the corner of 31 doors. An employee of the corporation replaced
each of these doors. The trial court granted the landlord's motion for
summary judgment, dismissing the tenant's claims for negligence and
strict liability.' The tenant appealed.
B. The Decision
In an opinion written by Justice Broussard 6 the California Supreme
Court concluded that the trial court erred as to both causes of action
and reversed the grant of summary judgment. 7 The California Supreme
Court reached this conclusion by examining the development of strict
liability in California. Strict liability in tort has been broadened since
first announced in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' Initially
limited to manufacturers,9 strict liability has been extended to all who
are part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise, and to
(1965); when land is leased for a purpose involving admission of the public, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §359 (1965); when there are parts of land retained in the lessee's control
which the lessee is entitled to use, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §360 (1965); when there
are parts of land retained in the lessor's control but necessary to the safe use of the part
leased, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §361 (1965); and when negligent repairs are made
by the lessor, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §362 (1965).
5. Becker v. IRM Corporation, 38 Cal. 3d at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
6. Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 470, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 223. Justice Lucas wrote an opinion in which he concurred and dissented, with Justice
Mosk concurring in the Lucas opinion. id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
7. Id. at 469, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
8. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
9. Greenman held that, as a matter of policy, manufacturers who put defective products
on the market should bear the costs of injuries that result. The costs should not be borne
by injured persons because they are powerless to protect themselves. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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licensors, bailors, and lessors.' Reflecting on this trend of expansion
of strict liability, the California Supreme Court in Becker found no
grounds to distinguish landlords from other classes of suppliers of pro-
ducts."
The California Supreme Court recognized the common law rule
exempting landlords from tort liability, but reasoned that to apply com-
mon law theories derived from an agrarian age in a modern urban society
would be anachronistic.' 2 The court noted the recent emergence of a
judicial and leglislative trend toward increased responsibility for
landlords.' 3 This trend was advanced in California by the court in Green
v. Superior Court.'4 Green declared the modern urban tenant in-
distinguishable from other consumers of goods, and found an implied
warranty of habitability in every lease of a dwelling by a landlord.' 5 The
court in Becker concluded that "a landlord engaged in the business of
leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent
defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises
were let to the tenant." '" The court expressly declined to decide whether
strict liability would apply to a disclosed defect' 7 or whether strict liability
would apply to defects in property that develop after the property is leas-
.ed.' 8 Becker was silent regarding a landlord's liability in tort for injuries
caused by patent defects in the premises. ' 9 The court did not establish
10. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
11. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464-66, 698 P.2d at 122-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219-21 (The in-
volvement of real estate in an enterprise is not a basis for immunizing the landlord).
12. Id. at 462, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The traditional common law rule
that absolved the landlord of any duty to make the dwelling habitable arose in the agrarianism
of the Middle Ages. Id. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
13. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 461, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The trend is said
to be directed toward "provid[ing] the tenant with property in a condition suitable for the
use contemplated by the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord and Te-
nant introductory note, ch. 5 (1977). The view reflected is that "no one should be allowed
or forced to live in unsafe and unhealthy housing." Id.
14. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
15. 10 Cal. 3d at 627-29, 517 P.2d at 1175-76, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
16. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
17. Id. at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 124 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4.
18. Id. at 467 n.5., 698 P.2d at 124 n.5, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.5.
19. Becker expressly addresses the liability of a landlord for latent defects of the premises.
Whether a defect is patent and obvious or is latent, would likely constitute a distinction without
a difference today in California. A landlord's duty to exercise due care in the maintenance
of the premises does not differ for hidden and obvious defects. See id. at 468, 698 P.2d at
125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222. In Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 54, 623 P.2d 268,
273, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707, 712 (1981), the court held that "a tenant's lack of knowledge of
defects is not a prerequisite to the landlord's breach of the warranty." By analogy, a tenant's
presumed knowledge of a patent defect should not preclude recovery in tort on a strict liability
theory for injuries sustained, but Becker left this undecided. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464 n.4,
698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4.
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a bright line for determining when a lessor is in the business of leasing
dwellings.2"
Becker also reversed the landlord's summary judgment victory over
the negligence claim.2 The application of a negligence theory for recovery
against a lessor by a lessee became unsettled when the California Supreme
Court in Rowland v. Christian22 abrogated the traditional classification
scheme for entrants upon the land. The Rowland decision made recovery
possible in a negligence action against a land occupier, for any entrant
upon the land, without regard to the entrant's status as invitee, licensee,
or trespasser.2" The Supreme Court had not been called upon to decide
whether a lessee could recover in a negligence action against the lessee's
landlord. Several subsequent appellate level cases 24 facing this question
found the rationale of the California Supreme Court in Rowland per-
suasive, however, and applied general negligence principles to the landlord
and tenant relation.
The Becker court concluded that a landlord has a duty to inspect apart-
ments for dangerous conditions at the beginning of a lease. 2 Nevertheless,
Becker recognized that a landlord's right of access to dwelling units is
limited by statute. 26 Consistent with this limited right of access, Becker
did not impose a duty to inspect the premises for defects that develop
after the lease begins. 27
20. The court wrote that a lessor of "numerous units" plays a substantial role in leasing
dwellings and thus found that IRM Corporation, as a lessor of a 36-unit apartment complex,
was in the business of leasing dwellings. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 219. At the other extreme, a lessor "engaged in isolated acts" may not be in the
business. See id. An "isolated act" likely would describe the subletting, for a brief period,
of an individual's home. The point at which a casual lessor will be considered to be in the
business of leasing dwellings, however, has been subject to varying interpretations. See infra
notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
21. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 467-69, 698 P.2d at 124-26, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221-23.
22. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See infra notes 28-33 and
accompanying text.
23. See generally Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 108, 443 P.2d at 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
24. See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980);
Evans v. Thomason, 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1977), Brennan v. Cockrell
Investments, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
25. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 469, 698 P.2d at 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. This duty to
inspect dwellings for dangerous conditions is consistent with the landlord's statutorily limited
right of access to dwelling units. Civil Code section 1954, which provides that a landlord may
enter a dwelling unit only in certain enumerated situations, none of which extend to inspec-
tions, does not preclude a landlord from inspecting dwelling units at the time of purchasing
or leasing a unit. Id.
26. See CAL. CIv. CODE §1954.
27. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 469, 698 P.2d at 12526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. See also
Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975) (no duty to inspect
for defects arising after lease begins).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At common law, a landlord was immune from liability in tort either
to a tenant or to others for injuries resulting from defects in the condi-
tion of the demised premises. 8 Immunizing landlords from tort liability
worked well in agrarian England, where the typical lessor transferred
possession of a farm for a term of years. The rule was not well suited
to an industrial and urban society, however, where the leasehold was
generally of shorter duration and the lessee was seeking a place to live
rather than acreage to farm.29
This rule of immunity had the harsh effect of precluding the injured
tenant from recovering in tort against a negligent landowner, and hence
frequently barred the tenant's only source of recovery. In an attempt
to mitigate the severity of the rule, the courts created several exceptions
to landlord tort immunity.30 One by one, the exceptions added avenues
for recovery in tort from the lessor.3" As the courts struggled to reach
28. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §63 (5th ed. 1984).
This immunity from tort liability was a product of the property law concept that a lessee acquires
an estate in land for the term of the lease. The lessee was thus deemed, for the duration of
the lease, to be the owner as well as the occupier of the land, leaving the lessor with only
a reversionary interest in the realty. Id. The lessor, as owner and occupier, was thereby subject
to all of the liabilities of one in possession, both to those who entered the land and to those
outside of the land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §356, comment a (1965). See also §356
(a lessor of land is not liable to his lessee or to others on the land for physical harm caused
by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artifical, which existed when the lessee took
possession, subject to certain enumerated exceptions).
29. A modern lessee holding a month to month tenancy in an apartment, for example,
is likely to lack both the incentive and the means to make costly repairs in the premises. The
incentive to repair defects may not exist for a tenant who must change residences in the pursuit
of employment. Those who rent rather than own their homes are also least likely, as a class,
to be able to afford the financial burden of making repairs or of adequately insuring against
the potential liability stemming from defects in the premises. Comment, Landlord Tort Liability
in California: Are The Restrictive Common Law Doctrines On Their Way Out?, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 401, 415 (1975). See also Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr.
at 709 (the expense of needed repairs will often be outside the reach of many tenants).
30. In California, for example, the general rule that a landlord is not liable to a tenant
or others for defects in the premises was held to apply in the absence of (1) a concealment
of a known danger, (2) an express covenant to repair or a promise to repair supported by
consideration, or (3) a statutory duty to repair. Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912,
920, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1968). See also Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63,
101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1972) (landlord not liable in the absence of fraud, concealment, covenant
in the lease, or statutory duty to repair).
31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §357 (1965) (lessor liable where there is
a contract to repair a defect which caused injury); Lee v. Giosso, 237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 46
Cal. Rptr. 803 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §358 (1965) (undisclosed dangerous
conditions known to lessor); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §359 (1965) (land leased for the admission of the public); id. §360 (land
retained in lessor's control); DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr.
772 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §361 (1965) (land retained in lessor's control but
needed by the lessee in order to safely use the part leased); id. §362 (negligent repairs by lessor);
Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17
just results while working within the framework of outmoded law,3 2
however, these judicially created exceptions to the general rule of im-
munity became severely distorted in their definition and application.
Caveat lessee33 was the order of the day.3"
The early aversion to tort recovery was not limited to tenants, but also
extended to persons entering the land." In a negligence action, the duty
a land occupier owed to a person entering the land was determined by
the status of the entrant as either an invitee, licensee or trespasser. 6 These
distinctions37 were major obstacles to recovery even when the land
Callahan v. Loughran, 102 Cal. 476, 36 P. 835 (1894); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d
321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972).
32. Comment, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 458, 474 (1970). The exceptions to the general rule appeared to have given the courts
ample room for creativity in their efforts to reach the "right" result. "For example, the California
courts have: (1) permitted a res ipsa loquitor instruction in a case involving a twenty year
old, decomposed and creaking common stairway, thus avoiding the question of whether a
reasonable inspection could possibly have disclosed the defect and requiring the defendant to
prove that he was not negligent or give a satisfactory alternative explanation; (2) held that
even though a stairway had been used exclusively by the tenant, the jury, rather than the court,
must determine whether it was a common stairway . . . ; (5) held that it was a question of
fact whether a ladder leading to a roof was a common stairway; [and] (6) held that a landlord
may be liable for concealing a latent defect even though he does not know the defect exists
but only has reason to suspect its existence." Id. at 474-475 (footnotes omitted).
33. "Let.the lessee beware." The phrase is borrowed from the maxim "caveat emptor"
(let the buyer beware), which summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge and
test for himself. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTONaRY 202 (5th ed. 1979). In a decision that created
what is known as the "furnished house exception" to the rule of nonliability for landlords,
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to be guided by caveat emptor, and found
an implied warranty of habitability. "The need and social desirability of adequate housing
for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor." Pines v. Perssion, IlI N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
34. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 520 (1984). At early common law, the lease was regarded as the
sale of the demised premises for the term. Upon this basis, the courts applied the same concept
of caveat emptor that prevailed generally in that day to the sale of all chattels, to the leases
of realty. See generally Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied., 344
U.S. 935 (1953). In 1872, California statutorily imposed a requirement that residential premises
be habitable. "The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation,
and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable . . . ." CAL. CIV.
CODE §1941. This statute does not endorse recovery in tort for tenants who are injured by
conditions that make their homes "untenantable," Seiber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 18 P. 260
(1888), and did not, therefore, eliminate the need for the lessee to "beware." Instead, the
statutory remedy is limited to the "repair and deduct" provisions of Civil Code section 1942.
Id. at 174, 18 P. at 261. Recent decisions, however, have held that this is not an exclusive
remedy, and that these statutes do not preclude the recognition of a common law warranty
of habitability. See, e.g., Secretary of Housing and Urban Development v. Layfield, 88 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 28, 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1978) (statutory "repair and deduct" remedy
is not an exclusive remedy); See also infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECoN) OF TORTS §356 (1965).
36. KEETON, supra note 28, §62, at 432.
37. An invitee is a person who enters the premises upon business which concerns the occupier
1000
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occupier had not exercised reasonable care.38 Landowners and occupiers
could thus use tort law as a shield from liability.
The Supreme Court of California abrogated these distinctions regard-
ing occupiers of land in Rowland v. Christian.39 The court in Rowland
held that an occupier of land is liable in accordance with general
negligence principles for injuries suffered by persons on the premises."
The California Supreme Court in Rowland did not explicitly decide
whether the general rule of negligence applies to the landlord and tenant
relationship. Rowland did, however, reaffirm the fundamental princi-
ple of negligence liability as set out in Civil Code section 17144' and found
the principle incompatible with a scheme of distinctions based on the
status of the parties involved. 2 This rationale was accepted by the Califor-
nia appellate courts, which found Rowland persuasive as applied to the
and upon the invitation of the occupier, express or implied. The most common invitee is the
customer in a store. KEETON, supra note 28, §61, at 419. The duty owed to an invitee is greater
than the duty owed licensees or trespassers. A licensee is anyone privileged to enter the land
.and-is most commonly a social guest of the land occupier. Id. §60, at 412. A trespasser is
a person who enters or remains upon the land of another without the privilege to do so. Id.
§58, at 393.
38. Ursin, Strict Liability For Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland
and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REv. 820, 821 (1975). "Under the traditional scheme, a full duty
of reasonable care was owed only to invitees. Licensees and trespassers were denied compensa-
tion even when the land occupier was admittedly negligent." Id. at 821-22.
39. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968). In 1957, England
abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees by statute, and held the occupier of
land to a common duty of care toward all persons lawfully on the premises. KEETON, supra
note 28, §62, at 432-33. Eight American jurisdictions have also abolished all distinctions be-
tween entrants on land. KEETON, supra note 28, §62, at 433. Five additional U.S. jurisdictions
have retained a distinction only as to trespassing adults. Id.
40. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Rowland found
no justification for limiting the liability of an occupier of land through classification of the
injured party as an invitee, licensee or trespasser. The court in Rowland wrote that "the classifica-
tions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee, the immunities from liability predicated upon those
classifications, and the exceptions to those immunities, often do not reflect the major factors
which should determine whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of land."
id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. The classifications were rigid and could
only lead to further complexity, confusion, and injustice. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 104. The distinctions were also contrary to a statutory scheme that all persons are
responsible for injuries caused by their failure to exercise ordinary care. See CAL. Civ. CODE
§1714, which provides that "Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care of skill in
his management of his property or person, . . ." An exception to this principle could be made
if clearly supported by public policy. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 100, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 564. Rowland, however, found no justification for the classification of entrants upon
the land. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
41. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 111, 443 P.2d at 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
42. Id. at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The definitions of the classifica-
tions had been so manipulated by the courts that a "semantic morass" had resulted, according
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
631 (1959).
1001
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landlord and tenant relation.43 For example, a personal injury claim of
a tenant, based on a general negligence theory, was resolved against the
landlord by the California Fourth District Court of Appeal in Brennan
v. Cockrell Investments, Inc." In Brennan, a tenant sought to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in a fall off the stairway of a
house he rented from the owner."3 The tenant fell when the railing broke.
The Brennan court held that Rowland had changed the common law rules
concerning landlord tort liability and that no tort immunity exists for
landlords when they are sued by their tenants." Brennan reiterated the
policy of Civil Code section 171447 and held that no compelling policy
reason existed to support judicial amendment of the code to preclude
application to landlords.48 The California Supreme Court then recognized,
by way of dictum in Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,"9 that the rule
of Rowland v. Christian applies in landlord-tenant cases."0
Thus, Becker's decision permitting recovery on a negligence theory
is the culmination of a judicial process set in motion with Rowland."1
Becker took the process a step further, however, by allowing a strict
liability claim against a landlord as well. Just as Rowland had opened
the door to later decisions allowing negligence claims against landlords,
the decisions of the California Supreme Court recognizing an implied
43. See, e.g., Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 324, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529-30
(1972).
44. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
45. Id. at 798, Ill Cal. Rptr. at 123.
46. Id. at 800-01, I1l Cal. Rptr. at 125.
47. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
48. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
49. 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972).
50. See id. at 183, 496 P.2d at 1285, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 917. The status of the plaintiff
is only one of the factors to be weighed by the trier of fact in determining liability. Id. Rowland
has also been invoked in litigation between trespassers and owners (Beard v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 135-36, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453-54 (1970)), and in
suits between lessors and lessees (Mezerkor v. Texaco, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 76, 90, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10 (1968)).
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. New Hampshire was the first state to recognize
a negligence action against a landlord. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). In Sargent, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court applied general negligence principles to landlord and tenant
law and held that a landlord "must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm." Id. at 534. The plaintiff had brought an action in tort against
the defendant landlord after plaintiff's four year old daughter fell to her death from an outside
stairway of an apartment owned by the defendant. Id. at 529. The stairway had been negligently
constructed but the court declined to hold the landlord liable on a broadened concept of a
failure to make proper repairs. Instead, the court reversed the general rule of nonliability for
landlords, holding that liability was "more realistic." Id. at 533. "We think that now is the
time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be relegated to the history books where it
more properly belongs." Id. New Hampshire reached this conclusion "naturally and inexorably"
after an earlier state decision established an implied warranty of habitability in an apartment
lease transaction. See Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971).
1002
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warranty of habitability in residential leases52 fueled the possibility that
the court would hold landlords strictly liable for injuries caused by defects
in leased premises.
Prior to the decision of the California Supreme Court in Green v.
Superior Court,3 the traditional common law rule had absolved the
landlord of any duty to maintain the leased premises in a habitable con-
dition during the term of the lease. 4 The action in Green had been com-
menced by a landlord who was seeking, through an unlawful detainer
proceeding, possession of the premises and $300 in back rent.55 The tenant
admitted nonpayment of rent but cited as a defense16 the landlord's failure
to maintain the leased premises in a habitable condition.17 The court held
that the statutory "repair and deduct" provisions of Civil Code sections
1941 through 1942.158 were not an exclusive remedy for tenants, and did
not preclude the development of new common law principles in this area. 9
The Civil Code merely granted the tenant an additional remedy to
whatever remedy a tenant may possess at common law. 60 The Califor,
nia Supreme Court thus permitted the tenant to assert the landlord's
breach of an implied warranty of habitability in the premises as a defense
to the landlord's unlawful detainer action. 6' This finding of an implied
covenant of habitability cleared the path for a tenant to recover in tort
against a landlord for defective premises. Since the common law rationale
which had precluded finding an implied covenant of habitability was so
closely related to the rule of landlord tort immunity,62 the imposition
52. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 712 (1974). The rationale that an implied warranty of habitability exists in residen-
tial lease transactions in California was first adopted by an appellate court in Hinson v. Delis,
26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 68-71, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665-67 (1972). For a leading case in this field,
see generally Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (implied
warranty of habitability measured by standards in housing code).
53. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
54. Id. at 622, 517 P.2d at 1171-72, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
55. Id. at 620, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 620-21, 517 P.2d at 1170, I11 Cal. Rptr. at 706. The apartment building had
been cited by the San Francisco Department of Public Works for 80 housing code violations.
The tenant also detailed a long list of defects in the apartment, including "(1) the collapse
and nonrepair of the bathroom ceiling, (2) the continued presence of rats, mice, and cockroaches
on the premises, (3) the lack of any heat in four of the apartment's rooms, [and] (4) plumbing
blockages. . . " Id.
58. The "repair and deduct" provisions state that if a landlord does not make repairs
to the tenant's premises within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the defects, the tenant
may repair the defect and deduct the cost of the repair from the rent otherwise due the follow-
ing month. CAL. CIV. CODE §1942.
59. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 629, 517 P.2d at 1176-77, I11 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
60. Id. at 630, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
61. Id. at 631-32, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
62. Comment, supra note 29, at 406.
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of the implied warranty encouraged an outright judicial abrogation of
tort immunity for landlords.63 In language that foreshadowed the will-
ingness of the court to impose a standard of strict liability on some lessors,
the court found the modern urban tenant to be in the same position as
other consumers of goods.' Through a residential lease, a tenant pur-
chases housing from his landlord for a specified period of time. Accor-
ding to Green, this is a product the landlord is selling, and a tenant may
reasonably expect that this product is fit for the purpose for which it
is obtained, that is, as a living unit. 65 This reasoning certainly set the
stage for extending the doctrine of strict liability to landlords.
Strict liability66 was established in California with the decision in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 67 The theory6 was adopted to en-
sure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put defective products bn the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.6 9
Strict liability has been broadened considerably7 since first introduced,
in an effort to further the twin goals of accident reduction 71 and risk
63. See Comment, supra note 29, at 406. The elimination of tort immunity is not without
precedent in other areas of the law, as an active judiciary has undertaken the piecemeal abrogation
of traditional limitations on recovery. See generally Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d
648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (parental immunity); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d
70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (interspousal immunity for negligence); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d
683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (interspousal immunity for intentional torts); Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (refusal to create a sibling immunity); Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (sovereign
immunity); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (charitable immunity); Silva
v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939) (charitable immunity).
64. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
65. Id.
66. Strict liability is liability imposed without regard for the fault of the defendant. Strict
liability is "applied by the courts in product liability cases in which a seller is liable for any
and all defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten a consumer's personal safety."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (5th ed. 1979).
67. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
68. The theory originally held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort "when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 700. Since liability is in tort, a contract between the parties is not required, id. at
63, nor must fault of the defendant be established. Plaintiff need only show the product as
marketed was "unsafe for its intended use." Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
69. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
70. "Decisions advancing this principle (of strict liability) since 1963 have been described
as a tidal wave, a flood, and a prairie fire . . . a breakthrough, a new insight, and . . .
a new era." Ursin, supra note 38, at 825 n.22, citing R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JusncE
101 (1969).
71. A recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals carried the goal of accident reduc-
tion to a logical extreme. The court held the manufacturer of a "Saturday night special" hand-
gun strictly liable for the injury to an innocent person who was shot with one of the guns
during a crime. Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159-60 (1985). In reaching
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distribution. The strict products liability "revolution" 72 soon brought
within its ambit retailers," wholesalers,74 and lessors of personalty." Ad-
ditionally, lower appellate courts in California promptly applied the
holding in Greenman to the field of real property. In Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc.,"r for example, a builder who mass produced homes was
strictly liable in tort when the heating system installed in a home failed.
The court could find no meaningful distinction between the mass pro-
duction and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of goods,
such as automobiles, to which strict liability had been applied." Final-
ly, the landlord and tenant relationship was not entirely excluded from
the scope of strict liability prior to Becker. In Fakhoury v. Magner a
landlord was held strictly liable in tort for injuries sustained by a tenant
when the tenant fell through the loose springs of a sofa that had been
leased with the apartment." The Fakhoury court wrote that liability was
not based on any defect in the premises, however. Rather, the court ex-
tended the rationale of Price v. Shell Oil Co., 9 in which the court held
the lessor of a used ladder strictly liable for injuries that resulted when
the ladder collapsed under a lessee and the lessor was in the business
of making these equipment leases." The Fakhoury court did not believe
the mere presence of a landlord and tenant relationship justified an ex-
ception to Price,8' and held the landlord liable as a lessor of furniture.
This holding was expanded in 1976 to include fixtures."2 Despite this ex-
pansion, 3 the lessor of realty seemed to be outside the scope of strict
the decision, the Maryland Court noted the desirability of using the flexibility of the common
law to fit the needs of society. Id. at 1159.
72. Ursin, supra note 38 at 825.
73. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
74. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557 (1965).
75. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251-52, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
182 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
76. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
77. Id. at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752. A defect in the condition of the land also gave rise
to strict liability in tort in Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 615, 77 Cal.
Rptr..633, 639 (1969). In Avner, the manufacturer of a residential lot had employed a defective
manufacturing process which caused subsidence. Id.
78. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1972).
79. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
80. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77 (citing Price v. Shell Oil
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970)).
81. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
82. Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d.948, 961-62, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69, 78 (1976) (landlord
liable in tort for a defective heater when court could find no reason to distinguish between
appliances attached to the realty and furniture which is not).
83. See, e.g., Garci v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (licensor
of personalty an integral part of the overall marketing enterprise that should bear the cost
of injuries resulting from defective products).
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liability for defects of the premises. By definition, strict liability had been
restricted to products. 4 In an effort to promote a public policy which
values safe and clean housing, however, Green was willing to advance
the fiction that an apartment may also be a "product," 5 since the te-
nant, through a residential lease, is seeking to purchase housing "as any
other normal consumer of goods."", Although the advancement of the
concept of housing as a product may make more palatable the exten-
sion of strict liability to landlords who lease residential dwellings, no
court has yet held housing to be any more than "like" a product. The
application of strict liability in tort has been broadened since first ap-
plied in Greenman.87 Among the policy reasons cited in support of this
broadening have been the desirability of distributing the risk of loss among
those in the best position to bear and distribute the loss8 and the expec-
tation that this approach will also provide a means of ultimately reduc-
ing accidents.89
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The decision in Becker marks the broadest judicial expansion of strict
liability in California and is a logical extension of existing products liability
precedents.90 Although the holding that a negligence action may be
brought against a landlord had been anticipated by earlier appellate court
decisions, 9' the jump to strict liability for defective products had not been
84. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. "The purpose
of (strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers . . ." (emphasis added). Id.
85. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
86. Id.
87. A dispute now exists in California, for example, whether strict liability in tort may
attach when a defective transmission of electricity has occurred. Electric transmissions have
generally been considered services and would fall outside the traditional scope of strict liability
theory. Comment, Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability Be Plugged In?, 11 LoY.
L.A.L. Rav. 775, 778 (1978). The appellate courts have split on the issue and the California
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the matter. See generally United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985) (strict liability does not
attach to defective transmissions of electricity); Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 166 Cal.
App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985) (manufacturer of electricity strictly liable for defective
transmissions when electricity is actually in the stream of commerce and is expected to be at
marketable voltage).
88. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 (1972).
89. Ursin, supra note 38 at 829. One commentator has suggested that accidents may be
reduced by "providing a financial incentive for manufacturers of products to reduce the level
of accidents below that which would exist under a negligence standard of liability." Id.
90. See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or
Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. RE,. 19, 158 (1975) (predicting that landlords would face strict
liability for injuries caused by defective premises).
91. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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endorsed by any of the lower appellate courts. Whether the decision will
have the effect of imposing "an unusual and unjust burden on property
owners" 92 remains to be seen. Strict liability has been imposed on
landlords by statute in Louisiana93 since the early 1800's9" without creating
any significant difference between the insurance rates for landlords in
Louisiana and for those in other states. 9" No other state has imposed
strict liability upon landlords or other lessors of defective premises. 96
The burden of strict liability on landowners will depend in part on
the extent of the application of this theory. Becker held that a landlord
engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is subject to liability, 97 but
did not establish specific guidelines for determining when a lessor is
engaged in the business of leasing dwellings. The defendant owned
"numerous units" and therefore was within the scope of the theory. 98
A person who regularly leases a room in a house, however, may also
be in "business," and would be in a class of people least likely to be
able to afford strict liability. Nothing in the Becker opinion confines ap-
plication of the theory to lessors of multiple residences, leaving open
to question the liability of the person who regularly rents a room in the
family home or who only owns one rental unit.
Becker is perhaps most troublesome for the issues left unresolved by
the opinion. Becker does not decide whether defects which develop after
a property has been leased will fall within the ambit of strict liability. 99
Traditionally, a product must be defective at the time it leaves the hands
92. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 301 A.2d 463 (1973)).
93. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952). The statute imposes strict liability on
all lessors: "The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing,
which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence
of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since,
provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the
lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same." Id.
94. Love, supra note 90, at 142.
95. Id. at 135 n.662. In 1985 the Louisiana legislature passed six bills designed to limit
the liability exposures of the state or other public entities, in response to "tremendous" growth
in payment of liability claims. Bus. INs., Aug. 5, 1985, at 23, col. 1. One of the bills, H.B.
68, makes a public entity strictly liable only for injury or damage related to buildings, and
only if the defect had been discovered and there had been a reasonable opportunity to make
a repair. Id. The need for this legislation is evidence that Louisiana has not been spared all
of the expected consequential expenses of strict liability, despite the apparently ordinary in-
surance rates for Louisiana landowners.
96. The Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly declined to allow a strict liability claim
against a lessor of defective premises in Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 301 A.2d 463, 467 (1973).
97. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
98. Id.; Cf. Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 234 A.2d 415, 418-19 (1967) (The lessor
of a two family dwelling was held not a mass lessor so as to allow recovery for breach of
an implied warranty of habitability).
99. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 467 n.5, 698 P.2d at 124 n.5, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.5.
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of a particular seller for strict liability to attach.'00 This general rule,
however, conflicts with the implied warranty of habitability in Green,
in which the landlord was deemed to owe a duty to maintain the premises
in a habitable condition. An extension of liability for defects in the
premises that develop after the lease begins is therefore a logical exten-
sion and is likely.
Since liability under Becker is in tort, and not in contract,'0 ' and since
public policy reasons have compelled this result, liability cannot be waived
by the tenant.' 2 A landlord would not likely be permitted to escape lia-
bility simply by disclosing defects in the premises. Refusing to give ef-
fect to a tenant's waiver of a landlord's liability would also be consis-
tent with statutory provisions requiring that apartments be maintained
in habitable condition. 03 The California Supreme Court has already made
the landlord the insurer for any injury suffered by a tenant because of
a defect in the premises that existed at the start of the lease.' 4 An
analogous judicial application of Green, imposing strict liability on a
landlord for any defect in the premises leased, without regard to the time
at which the defect developed, would complete what appears to be a
judicial mission to make absolute insurers of landlords. 03
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment g at 351 (1965). But cf. Kriegler,
269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (heater became defective eight years after
installation); Avner, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (defect in the land did
not appear for six years); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 583-85, 360
P.2d 897, 903-04, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 263-64 (1961) (liability may be a function of the service
life of the individual components of the premises).
101. See, e.g., Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; Crane
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 218 -Cal. App. 2d 855, 860, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963) (manufac-
turer's liability for defective product is not created by contract, but is imposed by law and
is governed by the law of strict liability in tort).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE §1953 (public policy precludes modification or waiver of certain specified
rights of lessee, including the lessee's right to assert a cause of action against the lessor which
may arise in the future, CAL. CrV. CODE §1953(a)(2), or the lessee's right to have the landlord
exercise a duty of care to prevent personal injury or personal property damage where that
duty is imposed by law. CAL. CIV. CODE §1953(a)(5); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY §§5.6, 17.6 (1977) (supporting the invalidation of exculpatory clauses).
103. CAL. CIV. CODE §1942.1. "Any agreement by a lessee of a dwelling waiving or modifying
his rights under [the "repair and deduct" provisions of Civil Code] Section[s] 1941 or 1942
shall be void as contrary to public policy with respect to any condition which renders the premises
untenantable." Id.
104. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 487, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 698 P.2d at 139 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting). But see Comment, supra note 32, at 485. The defendant is not an insurer of the
consumer's safety. Id. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366-67 (1965).
105. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 487, 698 P.2d at 139, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting). To the extent that liability is imposed on a landlord for injuries caused by defects
in the premises of which the landlord could not reasonably have known, the accident reduction
goal of strict liability has not been attained. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Lucas wrote that
the policy "amounts, in effect, to insurance for tenants." Id.
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The possibility of liability will not likely force landlords out of the
rental market. A scenario in which the financial risk incurred through
renting a typical dwelling eviscerates the likelihood of any profit is dif-
ficult to fathom. Indeed, any real estate enterprise involves an element
of risk which property managers routinely analyze.,06 Some landlords
may choose to form minimally capitalized corporations, but tax disad-
vantages may preclude most from using incorporation as a shield from
personal liability.
More likely is a scenario in which landlords will carry increased liability
insurance, at premium rates that may be expected to rise as claims by
tenants increase. These increased costs will be passed on to the tenants'07
in the form of higher rent, disproportionately burdening the lower in-
come tenant.' 8 For many other lessees, slightly higher rents may not
be an onerous solution to potentially unsafe conditions. Vastly improved
housing conditions, however, may not necessarily accompany higher
rents.0 9 Many potentially hazardous defects in dwellings, even frosted
shower glass doors, will remain, simply because reasonable landlords
will not foresee any hazard present in the item."0 Apartments may become
106. See Nourse, How Risky Is Income-Producing Property?, REAL ESTATE RaviEw, Fall
1985, at 66.
107. Rabin, supra note 34, at 558. "It is arguable that each increased tenant protection
and landlord duty must ultimately be paid by the consumers of rental housing, the tenants."
Id. The dissenting opinion of Justice Lucas in Becker also anticipates that a landlord will adjust
the costs of production by charging more to his tenants. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 485, 698 P.2d
at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., dissenting). "Unlike retailers, lessors, bailors, wholesalers
or others in the original chain of distribution of the product, the landlord owning used proper-
ty cannot adjust the costs of protection up the chain. He may only do it, at best, down the
chain of 'distribution,' .. . " (emphasis in original) Id. "The only logical result is that the
price of rental housing will increase because of the increased cost of insurance, assuming in-
surance can even be obtained for this purpose." Id. at 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 139 n.6, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6.
108. See Rabin, supra note 34, at 569. The rent-to-income ratio for low income renters is
significantly greater than the rent-to-income ratio for all renter households. See id. Assuming
rent increases are imposed without regard to the income of the tenant, the proportion of in-
come paid for rent by the lowest income tenants would increase relative to the proportion
of income paid for rent by all other renter households. "Those least able to pay increased
rents will lose more than they gain from additional [duties imposed on landlords]." Id. at
558. "Tenants formerly occupying [substandard] housing would either be forced out or be required
to pay a higher proportion of their income for rent." Id. at 559.
109. Imposing strict liability upon landlords for injuries resulting from defects in the premises
has been justified by the ability of the landlord to pass this increased cost to the tenants.
Comment, supra note 29 at 421. If this is the only reason for the rent increase, the tenant
has merely purchased an "insurance" policy from the landlord without any concurrent increase
in the safety of the premises. At least one commentator has tacitly acknowledged this practical
effect of landlord strict liability. Comment, supra note 29 at 422.
110. "No matter how carefully [landlords] inspect, and no matter how impossible to discern
the defect, they are now the last outpost of liability for countless unrelated products in which
they have no particular expertise." Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 485, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 234 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
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more costly to rent, but the added measure of safety will approach a
mathematical abstraction. The net effect may be to further reduce the
availability of privately owned low income housing."' Landlords who
cannot upgrade housing without incurring a deficit because rental in-
come is insufficient to cover the cost of repairs will be forced out of the
market. New investments in low rent housing will be discouraged, " 2 and
more government sponsored housing would be needed to fill this new
void.
If landlords are to be held absolute insurers of the premises they lease,
they may be expected to become more aggressive in keeping the rented
premises free from patent defects." 3 Landlords will also need to seek
out defects in order to limit their liability.'" Statutory restrictions on
a landlord's right to enter a dwelling unit will need to yield to the
landlord's need to make spot inspections for defects." ' Indeed, the
California Supreme Court could, consistent with the logic of past landlord
and tenant decisions, impose upon the landlord an affirmative duty to
inspect dwelling units for defects that may arise after the unit has been
leased to the tenant.' 6
Although California is the only state to have judicially imposed strict
liability on landlords for injuries suffered by tenants because of defects
in the premises," at least three other jurisdictions have considered the
issue." 8 Other cases may follow, possibly encouraged by the decision
111. Rabin, supra note 34 at 559.
112. Id. Construction of new publicly owned housing units has declined steadily during
the past decade. According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, construction on 9,000 new publicly
owned housing units was started in 1983, compared with construction of 35,000 units in 1970.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, series C20. Units in public housing projects
totaled 2.18 million in 1980. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Housing, vol. 1,
chapters A, B.
113. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 32, at 488. A landlord may decrease his liability by
inspecting and repairing. Id.
114. Comment, supra note 29, at 419.
115. See, e.g., Love, supra note 90, at 152-53. "If the tenant unreasonably refused to
permit the landlord to enter, the tenant could be precluded from bringing a strict liability action
.. Id. at 153.
116. At least two commentators argue for enforcement of this duty to inspect by making
"slumlordism" a tort in itself. See generally Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65
MicH. L. Rv. 869 (1967).
117. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting) (the decision of the court is without precedent).
118. New Jersey rejected strict products liability as a basis for recovery against landlords.
See Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 301 A.2d 463 (1973). Dwyer held that a landlord does not
have a duty to insure the safety of tenants, but only to exercise reasonable care. Id. at 465.
"To apply the broad brush of strict liability to the landlord-tenant relationship in a dwelling
house would impose an unusual and unjust burden on property owners." Id. at 467. New
York has also refused to adopt a policy of strict liability for landlords. See Curry v. New
York City Housing Authority, App. Div., 430 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1980). The Supreme Court of
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reached by the California Supreme Court in Becker. As more courts
decide that no injured plaintiff should be left uncompensated, greater
acceptance of strict liability may be expected.
Becker is a major step toward unlimited liability for all those who pro-
vide services, combined with any element of product, which ultimately
cause injury.' 9 If other jurisdictions prove as willing as California to
sweepingly apply strict liability, negligence claims may prove to be as
archaic and outmoded as the legal theories that once barred them. A
lessee would be foolish to suffer the burden of proving negligence when
recovery is available, even in the absence of fault, against the most prudent
and cautious landlord.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Becker is the culmina-
tion of a two decades long revolution in landlord and tenant law. Becker
held that a tenant who is injured by defects in a dwelling rented from
a landlord in the business of renting dwellings may state a cause of action
against the landlord on either a general negligence theory or under a strict
products liability approach. The embrace of negligence liability had been
forecast by the lower appellate courts in California and has brought
landlord and tenant relations current with modem standards for recovery
in tort. The decision of the court to permit a tenant to proceed on a strict
liability claim against a landlord for injuries caused by defects in the
premises is, however, without judicial precedent. The decision indicates
the willingness of the California Supreme Court to ensure that the owners
of rental property bear the burden of protecting their lessees from harm.
Although the burden will be borne by landlords who will need to ac-
quire additional liability insurance, Becker acknowledges that the tenant
will ultimately bear the cost of the protection. Prior to Becker, tenants
were forced to bear the costs of protecting themselves from injury in
their home through liability insurance which the tenant selected to meet
South Carolina refused to impose strict liability on a landlord when the alleged defect in the
premises was the work of an independent subcontractor. Young v. Morrisey, 329 S.E.2d 426
(1985).
119. Providers of services are not held strictly liable for defects in their performance. See,
e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954). Strict liability has been
applied, however, when elements of service combine with products to produce injury. See, e.g.,
Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1973) (defendant held
strictly liable for resultant injuries after choosing a defective location for a product). But see
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., L.A. Dally J. D.A.R., Jan. 7, 1986, at 86, col. 3 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1985) (pharmacist, although engaged in a hybrid enterprise combining the
performance of services with the sale of prescription drugs, not held strictly liable for injuries
caused by defects in drugs sold).
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the tenant's needs. The costs of protection will continue to be borne by
tenants after Becker, with the landlord acting as intermediary. Becker
thus does not create a windfall for tenants. Rather, the ruling imposes
a mandatory program of insurance, initially paid for by the landlord,
but ultimately financed by the tenant.
Matthew E. Karanian
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